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NOT ALL WATER STORED
UNDERGROUND IS GROUNDWATER:
AQUIFER PRIVATIZATION AND
CALIFORNIA’S 2014 GROUNDWATER
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT ACT
ADAM KEATS*
CHELSEA TU**
I. INTRODUCTION
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014
(“Act”) has been heralded as a “once-in-a-century achievement.”1  While
some have criticized the Act’s relatively modest regulatory goals, long
compliance deadlines, and weak enforcement powers,2 others have
hailed the mere accomplishment of the state passing some form of
*Adam Keats is a senior counsel at the Center for Food Safety, where he focuses on water
privatization issues.  He is lead counsel on several major water infrastructure lawsuits, including
Central Delta Water Agency v. Department of Water Resources (3d Appellate District Case No.
C078249), concerning the Monterey Amendments to the State Water Project and the privatization of
the Kern Water Bank, and Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (4th
Appellate District Case No. G051058), concerning the Cadiz water mining project.  He received his
J.D. from UC Davis School of Law.
**Chelsea Tu is a staff attorney at the Center for Biological Diversity.  She works on limiting land
development and preserving freshwater resources for the public and endangered species.  Ms. Tu
received her J.D. from the American University Washington College of Law with a focus on
Environmental Law and holds a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Sciences from the University
of California at Berkeley.
1 See Quinn, Timothy and Snow, Lester, Viewpoints: Groundwater legislation marks turning
point to achieve reliable water supply, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.sacbee
.com/latest-news/article2613371.html; Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, CAL. WATER
CODE § 10720 et seq. (Westlaw 2015)[hereinafter “2014 Act”].
2 Jeremy Miller, California’s Sweeping New Groundwater Regulations, HCN.ORG (Nov. 10,
2014), http://www.hcn.org/issues/46.19/californias-sweeping-new-groundwater-regulations; Rob
DiPerna, Groundwater Legislation is Not Strong Enough (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.wildcalifornia
.org/blog/groundwater-legislation-is-not-strong-enough/; see also Bettina Boxall, Bills Regulating
State’s Groundwater Not an Instant Fix for Aquifers, LATIMES.COM (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www
.latimes.com/science/la-me-groundwater-20140908-story.html.
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groundwater legislation3 and celebrated the Act’s stated goals of protect-
ing existing water rights and local control of groundwater supplies.4
Some groundwater basins may prove to be well-suited for the regulatory
scheme imposed by the Act,5 but equitable regulation of other ground-
water basins may be challenged by current and future efforts to privatize
these groundwater resources.  Specifically, several major basins, includ-
ing the Paso Robles and the Kern, are threatened by the development of
water banking operations which function to replace groundwater re-
sources with privatized, banked water that would undermine the public
interest – a threat that the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
may be promoting.
II. GROUNDWATER REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA – LOCAL CONTROL?
While California’s groundwater has historically been mostly unreg-
ulated, there have been exceptions, primarily through court adjudication
of groundwater rights for specific basins.  Twenty-three groundwater ba-
sins, mostly in southern California, have court-ordered limits on pump-
ing and court-appointed water-masters to manage the basins.6  The
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 does not change this
basin-by-basin (or “local”) approach to regulation, as it seeks to accom-
plish its goal of making California’s groundwater resources more sus-
tainable by empowering local agencies to regulate their local
groundwater basins.7
Under the Act, any local agency or combination of local agencies
overlying a groundwater basin may now elect to become or form a
3 Lisa Lien-Mager, ACWA Applauds Passage of Groundwater Legislation, CALIFORNIA FARM
BUREAU FEDERATION (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.cfbf.com/CFBF/CFBFNews/NewsRelease/2014/
Groundwater_bills_will_cause_harm__farm_leader_says.aspx.
4 Office of the Governor, Signing Message (Sept. 16, 2014), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Ground-
water_Signing_Message.pdf; see also 2014 ACT, Uncodified Legislative Findings (a)(6) (“Ground-
water resources are most effectively managed at the local or regional level”); see also CAL. WATER
CODE §113 (“Sustainable groundwater management is best achieved locally through the develop-
ment, implementation, and updating of plans and programs based on the best available science.”)
5 For example, groundwater in Glenn County is managed jointly by 17 sub-areas that have
adopted and operate by mutually agreed upon basin management objectives. See Glenn County Gets
Ready for Action on Groundwater Management, CHICOER.COM (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.chicoer
.com/general-news/20150228/glenn-county-gets-ready-for-action-on-groundwater-management; De-
velopment of a Locally Driven Groundwater Management Plan, COUNTY OF GLENN, WATER ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE,  http://www.glenncountywater.org/management_plan.aspx; Allan Fulton, et al.,
Possible Approaches to Groundwater Management in the Northern Sacramento Valley, UNIV. OF
CAL. AGRIC. & NAT’L RES.NEWSLETTER  (Aug. 2003), http://www.glenncountywater.org/docu-
ments/PossibleApproaches-Aug03.pdf.
6 Groundwater Management, GROUNDWATER INFORMATION CENTER (California Dept. of
Water Resources), http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/groundwater_management/index.cfm.
7 See 2014 ACT, Uncodified Legislative Findings (a)(6); CAL. WATER CODE § 10723.
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Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA), with certain specific agen-
cies designated as the exclusive agencies within their boundaries, unless
they choose to opt out.8  The Act confers significant regulatory powers
on the local GSAs, including the power to assess fees on users,9 impose
monitoring and reporting of groundwater pumping,10 and impose con-
trols and limits on groundwater pumping.11  GSAs are required to create
and implement Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) for certain
high- and medium-priority basins in order to accomplish the goals of the
Act.12  The state Department of Water Resources is tasked with evaluat-
ing and assessing the GSAs and GSPs,13 while the State Water Resources
Control Board is empowered to step in when no GSA has been estab-
lished for a basin or when a GSA fails to meet its obligations.14
Ensuring local regulation of groundwater resources was likely es-
sential to the Act’s passage, and it makes some sense given the wide
variations of water use, needs, and geography across the state.  But “local
control” can have different meanings and very different consequences,
depending on which agency ultimately assumes the GSA role for a par-
ticular groundwater basin.  While many water agencies in California
serve a wide variety of users and operate democratically, other water
agencies are completely or largely controlled by a few users, or even just
one, making them less like regulatory agencies and more like functional
extensions of their particular members.15
The best known water bank in California is the Kern Water Bank, a
19,990 acre groundwater reservoir under Bakersfield that has the capac-
ity to store 1.5 million acre-feet of water.16  Originally owned and devel-
8 CAL. WATER CODE §10723(a), (c)(1), (c)(2).
9 CAL. WATER CODE § 10725.4(a)(3).
10 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10725.6 and 10725.8.
11 CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.4(a)(1) and (2).
12 CAL. WATER CODE § 10727(a).
13 CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.
14 CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2.
15 See Salyer Land Co v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (finding because a water
storage district does not exercise normal governmental authority, and its actions disproportionately
affect landowners because the economic burden of its operations is confined to landowners, it is not
a denial of equal protection to withhold the right of franchise from those who do not own land); but
see Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d 660, 668 (1976) (distinguishing facts from Salyer since residents
of the Imperial Irrigation District rely on the district for all their water and power needs, about two-
thirds of the county’s residents are from urban communities, and only half of these own their own
homes; thus concluding that CAL. WATER CODE  § 21100’s limitation on the district’s board member
eligibility is “unconstitutional as applied to real parties in interest on the ground that it deprives both
candidates and voters in Imperial Irrigation District of equal protection of the laws in violation of the
United States Constitution and the California Constitution.”).
16 WATER HEIST: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE CASHING IN ON CALIFORNIA’S WATER, PUBLIC
CITIZEN 7 (Dec. 2003), https://www.citizen.org/documents/Water_Heist_lo-res.pdf; see also Kern
Water Bank Authority FAQ, http://www.kwb.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/Pages.Page/id/352#faq_13.
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oped by the Department of Water Resources, the water bank was
transferred to private control through the Monterey Agreement in 1995.17
The Kern Water Bank is now managed by a joint powers authority com-
posed of several water districts and one private company, Westside Mu-
tual Water Company.18  Westside Mutual Water Company is a holding of
Paramount Farming Company, which is owned by Lynda and Stewart
Resnick.19  Through Paramount Farming Company and Westside Mutual
Water Company, the Resnicks own or control a majority (approximately
59 percent) of the total shares of the Kern Water Bank.20  Another major
interest in the bank is the large agribusiness and real estate interest,
Tejon Ranch Company which completely controls the Tejon-Castac
Water District, a member of the joint powers authority.21
In recent years, water districts and water users near the Kern Water
Bank have complained about the bank’s operation, alleging that it was
causing their wells to go dry.22  In 2010, several lawsuits were filed over
the transfer of the bank from the state to the joint powers authority, in-
cluding a suit by neighboring water districts.23  In 2014, Judge Frawley
of the Superior Court of California for the County of Sacramento held
that environmental review regarding the Kern Water Bank failed to ade-
quately analyze the potential environmental impacts of the transfer of the
bank from state to local control and failed to adequately analyze the po-
tential impacts of the use and operation of the bank as a water bank
operation.24  The Kern Water Bank serves as a cautionary tale of what
may happen to the state’s groundwater resources and the environment
when a “locally” controlled, unregulated water bank is in fact run by
powerful agribusinesses and developers.
17 Steven Mayer, Judge Orders Review of Kern Water Bank, BAKERSIFELD CALIFORNIAN
(Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.bakersfieldcalifornian.com/local/x782595801/Judge-orders-review-of-
Kern-Water-Bank. .
18 WATER HEIST, 7-8.
19 WATER HEIST, 7-8.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Lois Henry: More wells go dry in Rosedale, THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (July 31,
2010), http://www.bakersfield.com/News/2010/08/01/LOIS-HENRY-More-wells-go-dry-in-Rose
dale.html
23 Central Delta Water Agency, et al. v. California Department of Water Resources, Sacra-
mento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000561; Rosedale-Rio Bravo Water Storage Dis-
trict, et al. v. California Department of Water Resources, Sacramento County Superior Court Case
No. 34-2010-80000703; Central Delta Water Agency, et al. v. Kern County Water Agency, Sacra-
mento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000719.
24 Central Delta Water Agency, et al. v. California Department of Water Resources, Sacra-
mento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000561; Rosedale-Rio Bravo Water Storage Dis-
trict, et al. v. California Department of Water Resources, Sacramento County Superior Court Case
No. 34-2010-80000703; ruling available at: http://www.cp-dr.com/sites/default/files/KWB%20rul
ing%20100214.pdf.
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With local interests being given the responsibility – and the power –
to regulate “their” local groundwater basins, the question is: how effec-
tive will local agencies be in meeting the sustainability goals of the Act,
especially when long-term sustainability may directly conflict with a cor-
poration’s short-term profit goals?  While the Act provides for some state
oversight of local GSAs, without explicit benchmarks and defined met-
rics there is a good chance that this oversight will be ineffective.  Ulti-
mately, statewide groundwater regulation that relies on locally-controlled
agencies, many of which, while ostensibly public agencies, are controlled
or dominated by their private industry members, is not likely to succeed
in achieving an equitable and sustainable groundwater management sys-
tem on a statewide level.
The Act’s lofty goals face another considerable hurdle: in addition
to the privatization of water agencies, aquifers are increasingly becoming
privatized through increased use and growth of water banking and water
exchanges.  Those who represent agricultural land developers and inves-
tors argue that water trading mechanisms will “increase flexibility and
resilience in water management,” and call on local, state, and federal
governments to establish water banks and exchanges.25  In fact, the Act
appears to endorse water banking and exchanges by providing for blan-
ket, discretionary authority of GSAs to “perform any acts necessary or
proper to enable the agency to purchase, transfer, deliver, or exchange
water or water rights of any type of any person [ ].”26
Water banks operate in the same aquifers that will become regulated
under the Act, but with a critical difference: while the Act provides a
GSA the broad authority to regulate a water basin, including the author-
ity to orchestrate water exchanges and water banking, it does not address
the fact that banked water remains governed by surface water rights and
is not subject to traditional groundwater laws regarding percolated
25 See Culp, P., et al., SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE MARKET CAN MITIGATE WATER
SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 7 (Oct. 2014), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/market_mitigate_water_shortage_in_west_paper_glennon_final.pdf  (“In order to preserve es-
sential groundwater reserves, protect important environmental values, and support the development
of effective markets, states should better regulate the use of groundwater by monitoring and limiting
use to ensure sustainability, and by bringing groundwater under the umbrella of water trading oppor-
tunities . . . To facilitate and promote longer-term water transactions and transfers, state and local
governments should establish essential market institutions, such as water banks and exchanges.”).
Mr. Culp, one of the authors of this policy paper, represents agricultural and other land development
and investment interests. See Squire, Patton, Boggs, LLP, Peter W. Culp (Partner), http://www
.squirepattonboggs.com/professionals/c/culp-peter-w.
26 CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2(d) (A GSA may “Perform any acts necessary or proper to
enable the agency to purchase, transfer, deliver, or exchange water or water rights of any type with
any person that may be necessary or proper to carry out any of the purposes of this part, including,
but not limited to, providing surface water in exchange for a groundwater extractor’s agreement to
reduce or cease groundwater extractions.”)
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groundwater.27  Thus, if a medium or highpriority groundwater basin be-
comes a multi-use basin that includes imported water rights, overlying
rights, and interconnected instream rights, the relationship between those
rights, and the priority given to each of the rights-holders, remains un-
resolved by the Act.28  The responsibility for identifying and addressing
the foreseeable legal and use conflicts between imported water, overlying
use, and/or in-stream use where groundwater interconnects with surface
water is thus left to the GSAs, or ultimately, the courts.
This potential conflict will become acute in the likely scenario
where artificial recharge inhibits natural recharge so that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to determine the relative quantity of each.  Given explicit
provisions in the Act and statewide policy favoring storing surface water
underground,29 it is not difficult to envision a privately-controlled GSA
systematically drawing down percolated groundwater to create storage
space in the basin, and then replenishing the basin with imported water,
27 2014 ACT, §10726.2 (A groundwater sustainability agency may “(b) Appropriate and ac-
quire surface water or groundwater and surface water or groundwater rights, import surface water or
groundwater into the agency, and conserve and store within or outside the agency that water for any
purpose necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this part, including, but not limited to, the
spreading, storing, retaining, or percolating into the soil of the waters for subsequent use or in a
manner consistent with the provisions of Section 10727.2.”); 2014 ACT, § 10726.2 (providing that a
groundwater sustainability agency has flexible authority to implement conjunctive use or storage
programs, but that it “shall not alter another person’s or agency’s existing groundwater conjunctive
use or storage program except upon a finding that the conjunctive use or storage program interferes
with implementation of the agency’s groundwater sustainability plan.”; see also 2014 ACT,
§ 10720.5 (b) (“Nothing in this part, or in any groundwater management plan adopted pursuant to
this part, determines or alters surface water rights or groundwater rights under common law or any
provision of law that determines or grants surface water rights.”).
28 See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 2013 UPDATE, CHAPTER 9: CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT
AND GROUNDWATER STORAGE, 9-9 to 9-10 (2014), http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/
cwpu2013/Final/Vol3_Ch09_ConjMgmt-GW-Storage.pdf.
29 2014 ACT, § 10720.1(g) provides that it is the intent of the Legislature “[t]o increase
groundwater storage and remove impediments to recharge”; GSAs need to manage groundwater
basins without causing an “undesirable result,” which would be triggered by one or more of several
effects including “Chronic lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant and unreasonable
depletion of supply if continued over the planning and implementation horizon . . .” and “Significant
and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage.” 2014 ACT, § 10721(v) & (w). See also CALI-
FORNIA WATER PLAN 2013 UPDATE HIGHLIGHTS (OCT. 2014), http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/
docs/cwpu2013/Final/00-Highlights_v24_WEB_Accessible_01-28-2015_FINAL.pdf (The Califor-
nia Water Plan “Roadmap for Action” includes the policy goal of “Expand[ing] Conjunctive Man-
agement of Multiple Supplies: Advance and expand conjunctive management of multiple water
supply sources with existing and new surface and groundwater storage to prepare for future
droughts, floods, and climate change.”); CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN 14 (2014), http://re-
sources.ca.gov/docs/california_water_action_plan/Final_California_Water_Action_Plan.pdf (“The
administration will support a comprehensive approach to local and regional groundwater manage-
ment by funding distributed groundwater storage projects that are identified in groundwater manage-
ment plans and removing barriers to implementation.”).
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with little consideration of the ability for overlying users to access the
basin or the long-term health of the surrounding ecosystem.
The Paso Robles Groundwater Basin is a prime example of a basin
for which equitable groundwater management is threatened by private
and water banking interests.
III. PRIVATIZATION OF THE PASO ROBLES GROUNDWATER BASIN
The Paso Robles Groundwater Basin (“Paso Robles Basin”) is a
high priority basin30 beneath more than 500,000 acres of land in northern
San Luis Obispo County (“County”).31  Agriculture constitutes 68.6 per-
cent of the total use of the Paso Robles Basin on average, and for agricul-
ture and many other uses, groundwater is the sole source of water.32  The
San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors has declared that ground-
water demand has met or exceeded the dependable supply of approxi-
mately 89,600 acre-feet per year in the Paso Robles Basin.33  Data
collected and analyzed from 1981 to 2011 indicate that groundwater
pumping of the Paso Robles Basin is near or at perennial yield,34 and the
basin may be overdrafted in areas east and north of the City of Paso
Robles.35  Coincidentally, land use has changed dramatically in the re-
gion from dryland agriculture to irrigated agriculture and residential
uses.36  The number of acres designated for vineyard uses, for example,
30 See CASGEM Groundwater Basin Prioritization Results: South Central Region (June
2014), http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/casgem/pdfs/lists/SCRO_Priority_05262014.pdf.
31 CASGEM Groundwater Basin Prioritization Results: South Central Region (June 2014),
http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/casgem/pdfs/lists/SCRO_Priority_05262014.pdf; see also
SAN LUIS OBISPO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND PLANNING COMMISSION, RESOURCE CAPACITY
STUDY: WATER SUPPLY IN THE PASO ROBLES GROUNDWATER BASIN 2 (Feb. 2011), http://www
.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Groundwater/rcs.pdf (estimating the Basin to cover 505,000 acres)
[hereinafter “2010 RCS”].
32 GEOSCIENCE SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., PASO ROBLES GROUNDWATER BASIN MODEL UP-
DATE 84 (Dec. 2014), http://www.slocountywater.org/site/Water%20Resources/Water%20Forum/
Computer%20Modeling/pdf/Final%20Report%20Text%20redacted.pdf [hereinafter 2014 GROUND-
WATER REPORT] (urban users make up 11.0%, rural users make up 2.5%, and small commercial users
make up 1.9% of the water demand for the basin); PASO ROBLES GROUNDWATER BASIN MANAGE-
MENT Plan 34 (Mar. 2011), http://www.prcity.com/government/departments/publicworks/water/pdf/
GBMP/plan/PasoBasin_FinalGMP.pdf.
33 2014 GROUNDWATER REPORT ES-9.
34 Id. at 1.
35 SAN LUIS OBISPO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND PLANNING COMMISSION, RESOURCE CAPAC-
ITY STUDY: WATER SUPPLY IN THE PASO ROBLES GROUNDWATER BASIN 4 (Feb. 2011), http://www
.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Groundwater/rcs.pdf [hereinafter “2010 RCS”].
36 WATER IN THE WEST, BEFORE THE WELL RUNS DRY: IMPROVING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
GROUNDWATER AND LAND USE PLANNING: APPENDIX A (CASE STUDY 1: PASO ROBLES AQUIFER,
NORTHERN SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY) 19-24 (2014), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/Before%20The%20Well%20Runs%20Dry%20-%20Water%20in%20the%20West%20
Stanford.pdf.
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has almost tripled between 1997 and 2007.37  While water use pressure
has increased in the past two decades, it is unlikely that the entire basin is
currently overdrafted.38
One prominent investor of vineyards in the Paso Robles Basin is
Brodiaea, Inc., a company solely owned by Harvard Management Com-
pany.39  Brodiaea’s strategy is to invest “in natural resources by purchas-
ing millions of dollars’ worth of vineyard land in central California.”40
The company was estimated to have spent at least $61 million to
purchase 10,176 acres in Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo Counties.41
In fact, Brodiaea currently owns over 14,600 acres in the Shandon-Car-
rizo area in San Luis Obispo County alone.42  Another large investor in
the area is Roll Vineyards, LLC, which purchased the 160-acre Justin
Wineries in 2010 and the 742-acre Hardham Ranch in 2011, and cur-
rently owns at least 1,307 acres in the Paso Robles area.43  Roll Vine-
yards is a subsidiary of The Wonderful Company, Inc., which is owned
by Stewart and Lynda Resnick and is one of the country’s largest pri-
vately owned agribusiness companies.44  The opportunities to market
37 Id.
38 For instance, the December 2013 draft version of the groundwater basin update concluded
that “Noticeable declines occur in the confined portion of the aquifer but do not reflect a large
volume of change in storage.”  However, this conclusion was omitted in the final version from Dec.
2014. See Paso Robles Groundwater Model Update PowerPoint Presentation (Dec. 2013), http://
agenda.slocounty.ca.gov/agenda/sanluisobispo/2868/UFJHQiAyIC0gUHJlc2VudGF0aW9uLvVdhd
GVyIEJhbGFuY2UgRXN0aW1hdGlvbi5wZGY=/12/n/22518.doc; see also 2014 GROUNDWATER
REPORT, supra note 32.
39 The Harvard Management Company was valued at $36.4 billion in 2014. See HARVARD
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., SEPTEMBER 2014 ANNUAL ENDOWMENT REport 1 (Sept. 2014), http:/
/www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/Final_Annual_Report_2014.pdf.
40 Valdmanis, R., Harvard Buys Up Water Rights in Drought-hit Wine Country, REUTERS
.COM (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/harvard-water-idUSL1N0V02Z3
20150122.
41 Fritz, M., Harvard Pushing Further Into Farm Sector with California Central Coast Vine-
yard Play, FARMLANDINVESTORCENTER.COM (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.farmlandinvestorcenter
.com/?p=722&option=com_wordpress&Itemid=171; Harvard Investors Buying Up Local Vine-
yards, PASO ROBLES DAILY NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://pasoroblesdailynews.com/harvard-inves-
tors-buying-local-vineyards/17896/.
42 San Luis Obispo County Property Information Search, http://assessor.slocounty.ca.gov/
pisa/Search.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
43 Blackburn, D., Water Bankers Purchase Paso Robles’ Hardham Ranch (July 15, 2013),
http://calcoastnews.com/2013/07/water-bankers-purchase-paso-robles-hardham-ranch/; Lam, J.O.,
$21 Million for Justin Winery Land, THE TRIBUNE (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.sanluisobispo.com/
welcome_page/?shf=/2011/04/19/1569266_21-million-for-justin-winery-land.html; San Luis Obispo
County Property Information Search, http://assessor.slocounty.ca.gov/pisa/Search.aspx (last visited
Feb. 1, 2015).
44 Wonderful Company Who We Are, http://www.wonderful.com/who-we-are (Oct. .03,
2015); Berfield, S., A Pistachio Farmer, Pom Wonderful, and the FTC, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 11,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_47/b4204068352545.htm (last visited
March 17, 2015).
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Paso Robles Basin water has also attracted the attention of Scott Slater, a
well known water rights attorney and President of Cadiz, Inc. (which is
developing plans to store water in the aquifer underneath the Mojave
Desert). 45
Land purchased by Brodiaea, Roll Vineyards, and other investors
have been driving up local water demand, further reducing the Paso Ro-
bles Basin’s groundwater levels.  The Agricultural Commissioner esti-
mated approximately 4,000 acres of new vineyards were planted in the
basin in 2012-2013, which added 4,000 to 5,000 acre-feet of water de-
mand to the asin during that time alone.46
IV. HOW GOVERNANCE OF THE PASO ROBLES BASIN TOOK SHAPE
AROUND BIG AGRICULTURAL AND GROUNDWATER
PRIVATIZATION INTERESTS
Since Paso Robles Basin is a high priority basin, a GSA that will
conduct mandatory groundwater management must be designated under
the Act.  A structure for a GSA in this basin has already been estab-
lished: in conjunction with passing the Act, in 2014 the State Legislature
also passed Assembly Bill 2453 (AB 2453) that established a process by
which a groundwater district for the Paso Robles Basin would be formed
by the approval of a majority of landowners, as opposed to residents,
within the Paso Robles Basin area.47  The new water district will likely
serve as the GSA for the Paso Robles Basin.48  While the formation of
the water district will be initially based on a one-owner, one-vote elec-
tion, the formation of the board of directors of the future water district
will be based on a hybrid system, with six of the nine directors elected by
landowners on a one-acre, one-vote basis and three directors elected by
registered voters in the basin.49  In addition, of the six landowner-elected
directors, two will be elected by “large” landowners (owners of title to
45 Scott Slater negotiated agreements for transfer of 277,000 acre-feet per year for San Diego
County Water Authority. See Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Shareholder: Scott Slater, http://
www.bhfs.com/people/attorneys/p-s/sslater.  Mr. Slater is also the CEO and President of Cadiz, Inc.,
which seeks to extract over 2 million acre-feet of groundwater underneath the Mojave Desert in San
Bernardino County.  Center for Biological Diversity, The Cadiz Water Project, http://www.biologi-
caldiversity.org/campaigns/Cadiz/.  On July 30, 2013, Scott Slater tweeted “@LPA Water: Paso Ro-
bles. High value beneficial use, lack of certainty, developing regulations, politicized, no market
trades; change is coming.” Scott Slater (@SlaterWaterLaw), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/slaterwater
law/status/362244731478089728.
46 San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo Urgency Ordinance No.
3246, at 2 (adopted Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Groundwater/prfi
nalord.pdf.
47 CAL. WATER CODE §37905(c)(6); A.B. 2453, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
48 2014 ACT, § 10723.
49 CAL. WATER CODE § 37911(b) - (c).
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400 acres or more), two by “medium” landowners (owners of title to
between 40 and 400 acres), and two by “small” landowners (owners of
title up to 40 acres).50  The directors elected by landowners may come
from any landowner class.51  The legislation thus represents a sort of
compromise between small landowners, large landowners, and non-own-
ing residents (who will still be subject to any district taxes and assess-
ments).  The initial legislation, without the compromise election system,
was spearheaded and supported by people and organizations closely as-
sociated with water privatization efforts, including the Paso Robles Agri-
cultural Alliance for Groundwater Solutions (PRAAGS).52  It remains to
be seen how the compromise system will affect the membership of the
board.
Section 10723.2 of the Act provides that a GSA shall consider the
interests of all beneficial uses and users of groundwater.53  However, the
governance structure for the potential Paso Robles Basin GSA, likely
weighing in favor of big agribusiness and water privatization interests,
raises serious concerns regarding use equity and potential water rights
conflicts, especially in light of increasing water demand within the heav-
ily-tapped groundwater basin.  While a GSA should represent all types of
water users, including non-landowning residents and the environment,
the governance structure of the likely Paso Robles GSA suggests that
will not be the case.  Rather than managing various users’ interests and
reducing conflict within the Paso Robles Basin, a future GSA dominated
by directors supported and elected by medium- and large-landowners
would likely enflame those conflicts and exasperate the basin’s already-
existing problems.  Overlyers like smaller agricultural interests and non-
agricultural residents could see their interests in percolated groundwater
diminished while the GSA authorizes the drawing-down of the aquifer to
increase the basin’s storage capacity and enhance the basin’s water bank-
ing potential, something that would benefit the larger landowners’ poten-
50 CAL. WATER CODE § 37911(b)(1)-(2).
51 CAL. WATER CODE § 37911(b)(3).
52 The constituents of PRAAGS include those who also work on behalf of Brodiaea and Roll
Global.  For instance, Matt Turrentine and Ernest Conant are two key members in PRAAGS who are
also associated with Brodiaea and Roll Global, respectively.  Matt Turrentine is a member of the
board of directors of PRAAGS, has been responsible for assembling and purchasing Brodiaea’s
Investments. See Fritz, M., Harvard Pushing Further Into Farm Sector with California Central
Coast Vineyard Play, FARMLANDINVESTORCENTER.COM (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.farmlandinves-
torcenter.com/?p=722&option=com_wordpress&Itemid=171. Ernest Conant is a partner at Young
Woodridge, LLP, who advises both PRAAGS and the Kern Water Bank Authority, See Who’s Who
in Kern County Water, http://www.wakc.com/index.php/whos-who?pid=3&sid=82:Kern-Water-
Bank-Authority (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
53 2014 ACT, § 10723.2.
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tial water banking profits while harming smaller, non-banking farms and
residents dependent on percolated groundwater.
The increasing ownership of land in the Paso Robles Basin by larger
agricultural and investment interests has escalated groundwater rights
conflicts between non-residential landowners and residents.  Recent land
purchases have resulted in the drilling of a number of new wells, many of
which are much deeper than existing wells.  For instance, Brodiaea has
recently acquired rights to drill 16 wells between 700–900 feet deep,
securing rights for seven 800-foot wells just days before a ban on new
wells went into effect.54  Brodiaea’s wells will be twice as deep as the
average residential well in the region.55  Local residents provided testi-
mony in Summer 2013 regarding significant drops in well levels and
wells going dry, especially in the Estrella, Creston, and Shandon sub
areas where companies like Brodiaea have begun planting and operating
new vineyards.56  On August 27, 2013, the Board of Supervisors adopted
an Urgency Ordinance that prohibits new water uses without 1:1 offset-
ting and metering requirements.57  But the ordinance contains significant
loopholes, including an exemption for an applicant who has secured a
vested right to complete site preparation, planting, or sale of product by
the date the ordinance became effective.58  Many of the larger interests,
including Justin Winery, applied for these exemptions before the ordi-
nance went into effect.59  The ordinance is due to expire in Fall 2015,
which will likely unleash a wave of applications for new wells that could
dramatically worsen the continued drawdown of the basin.
As the larger landowners and investor-backed interests secured the
passage of AB 2453, over 500 individual landowners representing over
54 Valdmanis, R., Harvard Buys Up Water Rights in Drought-hit Wine Country, REUTERS
.COM (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/harvard-water-idUSL1N0V02Z3
20150122.
55 Valdmanis, R., Harvard Buys Up Water Rights in Drought-hit Wine Country, REUTERS
.COM (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/harvard-water-idUSL1N0V02Z3
20150122; see also Case Study 1: Paso Robles Aquifer, Northern San Luis Obispo County, at 1,
http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Case%20Study%201.%20Paso%20Robles.pdf.
56 San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo Urgency Ordinance No.
3246, at 2 (adopted Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Groundwater/prfi
nalord.pdf.
57 See generally, San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo Urgency
Ordinance No. 3246 (Adopted Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Ground
water/prfinalord.pdf.
58 San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo Urgency Ordinance No.
3246, at 6-7 (adopted Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/PR+Groundwater/
prfinalord.pdf.
59 Sneed, D., Vineyards, Olive Farm Ask for Exemptions from Moratorium, SAN LUIS OBISPO
TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2013/10/02/2714656/paso-robles-ground-
water-basin.html.
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16,000 acres filed two quiet title actions to defend the superior priority of
their overlying water rights.60  While immediately focused on the rights
of the litigants, the actions could lead to adjudication of the entire ba-
sin.61  Adjudication could neutralize some of the Act’s provisions, and
depending on the outcome could prevent some of the more inequitable
scenarios discussed above from becoming reality.
Regardless of the outcome of the quiet title actions, the Paso Robles
Basin will face tremendous pressure to convert some of its capacity from
a percolated water resource to a groundwater banking operation.  For ex-
ample, landowners in the basin with access to State Water Project water
(for the most part, the larger investor-owned agriculture interests) will
have a strong incentive to draw down the basin to create capacity for
banked water.  After establishing a quasi-governmental agency such as a
GSA, landowners with access or who desire access to SWP water will
then be able to exchange SWP water allocations with groundwater from
the basin using broad water transfer, exchange, and banking authorities
from the Act.62
A 2008 groundwater banking feasibility study commissioned by the
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District already explored
potential locations and scenarios for water banking by first recharging
the basin directly with imported surface water and indirectly via in lieu
recharge, then recovering water from the basin in drier conditions.63  The
feasibility study explained that water banking “may serve an outside in-
terest that pays either water and/or money to store water in the ‘bank’ for
their time of need,” and estimates that 55 percent of recharged water in
the basin, which equals 90,000 AF, would be “recovered and delivered
for outside of the basin” during dry conditions.64  More than 252,000 AF
60 Steinbeck Vineyards #1, LLC et al. v. County of San Luis Obispo et al. (Case No. 1-14-
CV-265039, filed 05/08/2014 in Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara) (consolidated
with Eidemiller v. County of San Luis Obispo, et al. (Case No. 1-14-CV-269212, filed 08/11/2014)).
61 Nearby groundwater basins, like the Los Osos Groundwater Basin and the Santa Maria
Groundwater Basin, are currently in adjudication. See What Role Does Adjudication Play in
Groundwater Management, http://www.pasobasin.org/groundwater-management/judicial-oversight/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
62 See Cal. Water Code § 10726.2(d).
63 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, PASO
ROBLES GROUNDWATER SUBBASIN WATER BANKING FEASIBILITY STUDY FINAL REPORT 3-8 & 3-9
(Apr. 2008), http://www.slocountywater.org/site/Water%20Resources/Reports/pdf/Paso%20Robles
%20Groundwater%20Subbasin%20Water%20Banking%20Feasibility%20Study.pdf (acknowledg-
ing that “A water banking program differs from a groundwater recharge program by storing water
for others that may or may not overlie the portion of the groundwater basin involved in the ground-
water recharge activities. A water banking program requires an accounting system to distribute the
costs and benefits of the program among the participants (including the banking partners and overly-
ing groundwater users).”) [hereinafter “2008 WATER BANKING FEASIBILITY STUDY”].
64 Id.
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of dry year water supply may be sold to out-of-basin water users over the
course of a 40-year project.65  Thus, if groundwater banking materializes
in Paso Robles Basin, overlying and interconnected in-stream uses may
not have access to groundwater during times of drought because the ma-
jority of water saved in the basin would be allocated to out-of-basin
users, unless they also pay into the bank during times of plenty.  The
2008 groundwater banking feasibility study then recommended that spe-
cific banking partners be identified who might be interested in storing
water in the basin or using banked water.66
Water banking will likely be greatly facilitated by the formation of a
GSA for the Paso Robles Basin.67  The GSA will have enormous power;
while the Act contains some limitations on existing groundwater con-
junctive use and storage programs,68 there are no current imported water
programs in the Paso Robles Basin.  More importantly, the GSA will
have the authority to acquire surface and groundwater rights and import
and store water in the Basin.69  In fact, the Paso Robles Groundwater
Advisory Committee is actively exploring groundwater recharge oppor-
tunities, including agricultural irrigation and recharging the groundwater
basin via recycled water.70  The San Luis Obispo County Flood Control
65 Id. at 6-19.
66 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, PASO
ROBLES GROUNDWATER SUBBASIN WATER BANKING FEASIBILITY STUDY FINAL REPORT ES-7 (Apr.
2008), http://www.slocountywater.org/site/Water%20Resources/Reports/pdf/
Paso%20Robles%20Groundwater%20Subbasin%20Water%20Banking%20Feasibility%20Study
.pdf.
67 It is not surprising that the PRAAGS website explicitly promotes groundwater banking.
See Paso Robles Agriculture Alliance for Groundwater Solutions Q & A, http://www.praags.org/
FAQs/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
68 2014 ACT, § 10726.2  (A GSA “shall not alter another person’s or agency’s existing
groundwater conjunctive use or storage program except upon a finding that the conjunctive use or
storage program interferes with implementation of the agency’s groundwater sustainability plan.”)
69 2014 ACT, § 10726.2 (A GSA may “(b) Appropriate and acquire surface water or ground-
water and surface water or groundwater rights, import surface water or groundwater into the agency,
and conserve and store within or outside the agency that water for any purpose necessary or proper
to carry out the provisions of this part, including, but not limited to, the spreading, storing, retaining,
or percolating into the soil of the waters for subsequent use or in a manner consistent with the
provisions of Section 10727.2.”)
70 In May 2014 the County of San Luis Obispo signed a $657,502 contract with Carollo
Engineers, Inc., to evaluate supplemental water supply options for use in the Paso Robles Basin.
Agreement for Professional Engineering Services, executed May 8, 2014, http://www.slocounty-
water.org/site/Water%20Resources/Water%20Forum/SOS/pdf/Supply%20Options%20Carollo%20
Agreement%20Executed.pdf (“Carollo Contract”).  The February 2015 administrative draft of this
evaluation discusses options to recharge the basin with up to 3,300 AF of recycled water from
wastewater treatment plants in the Paso Robles area, with the potential of blending recycled water
with Nacimiento Project water. CAROLLO ENGINEERS, INC., PASO BASIN SUPPLEMENTAL WATER SUP-
PLY OPTIONS TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NO. 4: RECYCLED WATER SUPPLY OPTIONS AND POINTS OF
DELIVERY 4-28, 4-29 (Feb. 2015), http://oceanocsd.org/agendas/03112015%20Agenda%20Item%20
10C%20Paso%20Basin%20Recycled%20Water.pdf. Recent advisory board meetings also reflect ef-
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and Water Conservation District is apparently also contemplating water
banking options, although it is difficult to assess its progress since no
recent studies or documents have been disclosed to the public.71  Al-
though advocates for the new water district, including PRAAGS, assure
that groundwater in the basin will not be exported,72 the proposed ordi-
nance contains language that merely regulates such actions by requiring a
permit for exportation.73
The future GSA will likely be dominated by larger, non-residential
landowners.  Non-residential landowners and future banking partners
may find it in their common interest to interpret the legislative intent74
and lax definitions of safe yield and overdraft provided in the Act75
based on the opinion in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, which encourages
drawing down basins to create additional storage space and prevent water
“wasting.”76  Thus, in addition to exports, it is foreseeable that a future
GSA will encourage drawdown of the aquifer to satisfy massive crop
thirst as the drought continues, which will then create extra storage space
forts to obtain additional water resources for the basin, including releasing water to the Salinas
River, which will provide additional recharge to the northern portion of the Paso Robles Ground-
water Basin. Paso Basin Advisory Committee Meeting Agenda (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.slocoun
tywater.org/site/Water%20Resources/Water%20Forum/PRGWB%20Advisory%20Committee/Agen
das/pdf/PBAC%20Agenda%202015_2_19.pdf.
71 The Carollo Contract provides the San Luis Obispo County Flood Control and Water Con-
servation District has entered or will enter into a contract with another consulting firm regarding
groundwater banking. See Carollo Contract, at Ex. 1, p.1.
72 Paso Robles Agriculture Alliance for Groundwater Solutions Q&A, http://www.praags.org/
FAQs/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
73 See Draft Ordinance Regulating the Exportation of Groundwater, http://www.slocounty.ca
.gov/Assets/BOS/District+5/PDF/Draft+Export+Ordinance.pdf; see also David Sneed, Supervisors
Move to Restrict Groundwater Exports, SAN LUIS OBISPO TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2015), http://agenda
.slocounty.ca.gov/agenda/sanluisobispo/2868/UFJHQiAyIC0gUHJlc2VudGF0aW9uLVdhdGVyIEJ
hbGFuY2UgRXN0aW1hdGlvbi5wZGY=/12/n/22518.doc.
74 2014 Act, § 10720.1(g) (It is the intent of the Legislature “[t]o increase groundwater stor-
age and remove impediments to recharge.”).
75 2014 ACT, § 10721(v) (“Sustainable yield” is defined as “the maximum quantity of water,
calculated over a base period representative of long-term conditions in the basin and including any
temporary surplus, that can be withdrawn annually from a groundwater supply without causing an
undesirable result.”); 2014 ACT, § 10735(a) (“Condition of long-term overdraft” means the condition
of a groundwater basin where the average annual amount of water extracted for a long-term period,
generally 10 years or more, exceeds the long term average annual supply of water to the basin, plus
any temporary surplus. Overdraft during a period of drought is not sufficient to establish a condition
of long-term overdraft if extractions and recharge are managed as necessary to ensure that reductions
in groundwater levels or storage during a period of drought are offset by increases in groundwater
levels or storage during other periods.”).
76 Los Angeles v. San Fernando 14 Cal. 3d 199, 280 (1975) (“We agree with plaintiff that if a
ground basin’s lack of storage space will cause a limitation of extractions to safe yield to result in a
probable waste of water, the amount of water which if withdrawn would create the storage space
necessary to avoid the waste and not adversely affect the basin’s safe yield is a temporary surplus
available for appropriation to beneficial use. Accordingly, overdraft occurs only if extractions from
the basin exceed its safe yield plus any such temporary surplus.”).
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for imported waters to “recharge” the Basin.  As a result of future water
exchanges and banking, local residents will bear the additional cost of
digging deeper wells just to maintain their straws in the aquifer, and will
increasingly compete with each other over a diminishing percolated sup-
ply while banked supplies increase.
To prevent this outcome, a future GSP must be transparent by re-
quiring that all water users be accountable for their overlying water use
and groundwater-surface water interactions, as well as track the environ-
mental and neighboring well impacts of potential exports.
V. HUMAN USES VS. ENVIRONMENTAL USES
While landowners and residents have been at the forefront of the
water battles in the Paso Robles Basin, groundwater-dependent ecosys-
tems will be the first to be negatively impacted from further groundwater
drawdown and the implementation of water transfers and banking
schemes.  The Paso Robles Basin discharges to interconnected riparian
and aquatic ecosystems:  twelve percent of the basin naturally discharges
into the Salinas River and other rivers, and three percent of it sustains
riparian vegetation through evaporation.77  Despite substantial hydrologi-
cal connections between surface and groundwater in the Paso Robles Ba-
sin, no study regarding managing the Paso Robles Basin has evaluated
the effects of groundwater withdrawal have and will have on ground-
water-dependent riparian and aquatic systems in the area.  The operation
of the future groundwater sustainability plan (GSP) will result in envi-
ronmental impacts that need to be addressed in order to avoid undesir-
able results, including significant and unreasonable land subsidence,
seawater intrusion, water quality degradation, and depletions of intercon-
nected surface waters.78  The future Paso Robles GSA will also need to
comply with Section 10727.2, requiring GSPs to include groundwater
levels, groundwater quality, subsidence, and groundwater-surface water
interaction.79  Potential adverse environmental impacts from pumping
groundwater, water exchanges, and water banking within Paso Robles
Basin could be addressed only when the basin completes additional hy-
drological analyses and monitors pumping as discussed above, in order
to comply with its obligations under the Act to avoid undesirable results
including the depletion of interconnected surface waters and the species
that depend on them to survive.
77 2014 GROUNDWATER REPORT, ES-5.
78 2014 ACT, § 10721(w).
79 2014 ACT, § 10727.2 (a)(1)-(5).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of an unprecedented drought that has devastated com-
munities and ecosystems throughout California, comprehensive ground-
water legislation was finally enacted in 2014, granting local agencies
control over the state’s largest remaining water resources.  While local
management of groundwater resources may appear ideal, diverse inter-
ests at the local level will likely be undermined by those of powerful
agribusiness owners, investors, and water brokers who view water not as
a human right or environmental necessity, but a fungible commodity that
can be captured and sold in a market or exchange.  Paso Robles Basin is
just one of many basins across the state poised to convert to privately
controlled, for-profit water banks.  As California will continue to grapple
with increasingly frequent and severe drought due to climate change, the
major policy decision to privatize groundwater basins is not being ac-
knowledged, let alone discussed.  Water–whether in our streams, rivers,
lakes, or beneath our ground– is the ultimate public trust resource.  Cali-
fornia cannot afford to give water resources away to the highest bidder.
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